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INTRODUCTION
The principle goal of most criminal enforcement efforts, both do-
mestic and international, is to immobilize criminals. In order to ac-
complish this, three things are typically required: information, evi-
dence, and the criminal. The increase in criminality on an
international scale, along with the declining importance of national
borders in an era of globalization, makes it less likely that all three
elements will co-exist within the same national jurisdiction. For this
reason alone, the police and judicial authorities of one State are re-
quired to cooperate with the authorities of other States. Even if juris-
diction were established or mutually agreed upon in a particular case
involving more than one national territory, it is likely that the police
would still need assistance and cooperation in the areas of informa-
tion gathering, apprehension of the criminals, evidence procurement,
witness interrogation, confiscation of illegal funds, and extradition
concerns.
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Throughout Europe, as well as in a number of other areas of the
world, public concern about the spread of organized crime has pro-
vided an impetus for increased levels of cross-border police coop-
eration. There are numerous examples of criminal enterprises that
transcend national boundaries. Consider, for instance, a criminal
venture in which a group of drug traffickers from the United States
and Russia purchases drugs produced in South America and then
sells the drugs in the Middle East. This same group of criminals also
runs a prostitution ring throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The
enterprise deposits proceeds of their criminal activity into bank ac-
counts in Switzerland and other European Union Member States.
Criminal activities involving such a large number of countries are
hardly rare. As such, the need for some level of international coop-
eration and assistance is evident.
The need for cooperation in this regard is particularly apparent in
Europe. Economic, social, and political integration closely binds the
countries and peoples of the European Union. Indeed, the preamble
to the Maastricht Treaty asserts that the Member States are "deter-
mined to lay the foundations of an even closer union among the peo-
ples of Europe."' Confounding the process of closer integration,
however, is the fear of burgeoning transnational crime.
The European Economic Community's evolution into the more
cohesive European Union created both concerns and opportunities
over the future of more intensive trans-border police and security co-
operation within Europe. There is a very real concern that the in-
creasing closeness of the Member States of the European Union will
facilitate crime across borders: "[h]ard drugs, stolen cars, trafficking
in prostitutes, illegal immigrants; whatever the industry, the Euro-
pean single market is making cross-border crime easier.", For this
reason, there is growing pressure for increased international coop-
eration on crime prevention and policing within Europe.
1. Treaty on the European Union, Feb. 7. 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) pmbl.
[hereinafter Maastricht Treaty].
2. Convention Against Crime, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 1995, at 53 (discussing
crime in Europe and the measures undertaken to combat criminal activity); see also
Olivier Van Vaerenbergh, La Monnaie Unique, Une Aubaine Pour Le Crime?, LE
SOIR, Mar. 16, 1998, at 5 (arguing that a single European currency could lead to
increased cross-border crime in the European Union).
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This increasing integration of the Member States of the European
Union has led to cooperation on a number of new and virtually un-
precedented levels. One area of integration is that of assistance and
cooperation within the field of policing. Although many countries in
the world have long engaged in both formal and informal means of
cooperating within the field of criminal justice, the European Union
envisions a level of police cooperation going beyond anything previ-
ously established between sovereign nations.
In addition to the current efforts by the Member States of the
European Union, there has also been cooperation between the Euro-
pean Union and third party States, such as the United States. These
collaborative efforts exist on many levels, including cooperation in
information and evidence gathering, intelligence work, permission to
conduct investigations in the respective national territories, and ap-
prehension of criminals within foreign territories. Nonetheless, while
cooperation between police of different jurisdictions is hardly a new
phenomenon, the current scheme of cooperation in the European
Union is progressing rapidly and will reach an unprecedented level in
the near future.3 As increasing globalization and improving technol-
ogy has facilitated high-level international crime, it has also im-
proved mechanisms for detecting international crime and appre-
hending international criminals.
Despite the comprehensive nature and consistency of former
mechanisms of police cooperation, past efforts were not nearly as
ambitious-nor have they had such profound implications-as the
greater intimacy and cooperation emerging in the European Union.
Moreover, the existing and emerging means of police cooperation
within the European Union are much more integrative than other at-
tempted forms of international police cooperation. For this reason,
they are likely to have a profound effect, not only on international
crime, but also upon the European citizenry in general.
While there is a general awareness that international police coop-
eration will soon become a necessity, there is a great divergence of
3. See EU/Mediterranean States: Commission Practices for Euro-Med Con-
ference, EUR. REP., Jan. 5, 1996 (discussing the initiatives used to promote police
cooperation within the European Union); see also Monica den Boer & Neil
Walker, European Policing After 1992, 31 J. COMMON MKT. STUD., at 4 (describ-
ing briefly the origins of European police cooperation).
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views on how to accomplish, and how quickly to proceed with, the
task. The individual police forces of the Member States are at the
forefront of the European Union's declared intention to prevent and
combat international crime. These police organizations and their
practices vary widely, as do ideas about how the European Union
will utilize their services. Basic knowledge and understanding of
these variations is an essential prerequisite for developing effective
cooperation among the different groups.
Within the European Union, significant problems could arise from
this new level of police cooperation because many of the new forms
of police cooperation operate on the basis on information exchange
and the maintenance of large computer databases. Consequently,
there is an extreme risk of the violation of the fundamental right to
privacy. In addition, there are also very serious concerns about the
existence of judicial control over Community actions taken in this
sector. Finally, many individuals are alarmed about the lack of
democratic participation in the decisions and activities undertaken in
this new area of cooperation.
This article examines both the promises and potential problems of
increased police cooperation within the European Union. Parts I and
II comprehensively present and analyze the bases of transnational
police cooperation. These sections include a discussion of both tradi-
tional and European bases of police cooperation. Part III examines
the various criticisms of international police cooperation. Finally,
Part IV concludes that the present and future of this important level
of cooperation will depend on improvements in judicial and legal
support, and increases in democratization and data protection by the
Member States.
I. TRADITIONAL BILATERAL, REGIONAL, AND
MULTILATERAL BASES OF
TRANSNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION
A. THE UNITED STATES
The American system of policing has had a dramatic influence on
policing in Europe, and American police activity in Europe is unique
for a number of reasons. First, no other government maintains law
enforcement representatives in so many European countries. Fur-
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thermore, no other government possesses such a multitude of law en-
forcement agencies. Finally, no other government has exercised such
a powerful influence on the criminal laws, procedures, and investi-
gation techniques of other countries.
Before the Second World War, there was a movement towards
trans-Atlantic police cooperation and harmonization. Currently, the
United States has a strong position in the police activities in Europe.
Numerous American law enforcement agents are stationed perma-
nently in United States embassies and consulates throughout Europe;
even more are in Europe on temporary assignments. American law
enforcement in any given embassy may include representatives of
the Drug Enforcement Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigations, Se-
cret Service, Customs, Internal Revenue Service, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, and the military investigative services.' This
strong American police presence in Europe is the result of successive
attempts by American administrations to involve European govern-
ments in a worldwide war against international crime-particularly
the drug trade.
American-European police cooperation involves mutual help in
the detection of crime and detention of suspects. American forces
benefit from access to the European territory and access to informa-
tion possessed by the European police and investigative authorities.
Traditionally, the cooperation has benefitted Europe in a number of
important ways. European police forces use information from a mas-
sive worldwide communications network to which the Americans
have access. Americans additionally help their European counter-
parts by providing money and personnel for undercover operations.
In addition, European police officers train in their home country or in
the United States for proactive policing in the fields of drug crime
and other international criminal activity.
Despite the history of American police cooperation within Europe,
complications abound. For instance, the role of American police of-
ficials remains undefined-American police officials in Europe lack
the important and definitive powers to arrest individuals and to seize
evidence. On the opposite side of the spectrum, there is a concern
4. See ETHAN NADELMAN, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF POLICE
COOPERATION IN WESTERN EUROPE 135 (Cyrile Fijnaut ed., 1993) (describing
American law enforcement presence abroad).
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that American authorities in Europe tend to overstep their jurisdic-
tion. For example, the United States has been subject to criticism for
establishing greater international police cooperation in an effort to
combat money laundering!
Recently, John Moscow, New York Assistant District Attorney,
announced that his office might file criminal charges against over-
seas bank employees who fail to spot and report money laundering
schemes.6 London is the target of this initiative, where an estimated
five hundred million dollars generated by criminal activities, notably
drug smuggling and Russian organized crime, passes through banks
each day. The prosecutor adamantly stated, "I'm not conceding the
money laundering title to London. We do more of it in New York,
but we're not going to tolerate our bad guys moving money from
New York to London banks and using that to say that they are out of
our jurisdiction. 7 While this prosecutor's proposal might cause some
foreign banks to protest the United States attempt to exercise extra-
territorial jurisdiction, money laundering, as a global problem, must
be fought on a global level.
Several trends continue in the field of American police coopera-
tion in Europe. Relations between United States and European police
agencies will become more intimate as formal relationships prolifer-
ate and informal bonds deepen and expand. The United States has
great interest in the Europeanization of police cooperation. Illustrat-
ing this is not only the United States' lively participation in Interpol,'
but also in the relationship the United States has with Trevi.' Intelli-
gence and counterintelligence agencies in search of new missions
will focus increasing efforts on transnational criminals. Conse-
quently, jurisdictional conflicts will intensify as will the emergence
of new legal issues in international criminal law enforcement.
5. See Jack Nelson, Money Laundering: Now Global and Piling Up, INT"L
HERALD TRIB., Feb. 3, 1998, at C4 (discussing the global state of money launder-
ing).
6. See id. (remarking on American efforts to curb money laundering in Eng-
land).
7. Id.
8. See den Boer & Walker, supra note 3, at 4 (describing Interpol as the oldest
and largest intergovernmental policing organization).
9. See id. at 6 (examining the creation and functions of Trevi).
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B. THE MIDDLE EAST
The European Union and Middle Eastern countries also cooperate
in international policing.' The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
("EMP"), a far-reaching accord between the European Union and
twelve countries of the Middle East, is the most important formal
agreement." Instead of working towards numerous short-term goals,
this new partnership aims to create long-term stability and growth.
The process is based upon three basic pillars: (1) a political and secu-
rity dialogue emphasizing human rights; (2) economic and financial
services to create a free trade zone covering Europe and the Mediter-
ranean countries by the year 2010; and (3) the establishment of rela-
tionships among the people of the regions to help foster the values of
a civil society.'
2
In October 1994, the European Commission urged the Member
States of the European Union to restructure the European Union's
relationship with its Mediterranean neighbors, creating the founda-
tions for the EMP. The parties signed the Barcelona Declaration es-
tablishing the EMP on November 28, 1995.' The basic thrust of the
EMP is a catalog of principles designed to govern the relationship
between the European States and their Mediterranean partners," in-
10. See EU/Mediterranean States: Ministerial Conference on Euro-Med Part-
nership, supra note 3 (stating that the twelve Middle Eastern States of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership ("EMP") are Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, The Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey).
11. See id. (describing the EMP as a watershed agreement).
12. See Shada Islam, Middle East-Mediterranean: Barcelona Declaration
Praised, Nov. 30, 1996, INTER PRESS SERV. (noting that a landmark meeting in
Barcelona aims to identify common interests and open dialogue on political and
economic issues).
13. See Barcelona Declaration and Work Programme, Conclusions of the Euro-
Mediterranean Conference held in Barcelona, in BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 1995,
[hereinafter Barcelona Declaration]; see also Commission Communication of 8
March 1995 to the Council and the EP on Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy
of the European Union: Proposals for Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship, COM(95)72 final at 1.4.57; Islam, supra note 12 (discussing the establish-
ment of the EMP). See generally THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP:
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES (Richard Gillespie ed., 1997) (providing
commentary and analysis on the establishment of the EMP).
14. See Shada Islam, Europe-Mediterranean-A Partnership in Barcelona,
Nov. 24, 1995, INTER PRESS SERV. (noting that a landmark meeting in Barcelona
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cluding the peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for democracy,
enforcement of the rule of law and human rights, arms control, and a
commitment to fight terrorism and crime.
Specifically, the Barcelona Declaration covers three major topics.
First, it envisions both a political and security partnership to create a
common area of peace and stability.' Second, it calls for an eco-
nomic and financial partnership to establish a common zone of pros-
perity. 6 Finally, it anticipates a social, cultural, and human partner-
ship to increase exchanges between the countries taking part in the
EMP. 17 For the purposes of international police cooperation, the es-
tablishment of a political and security partnership is most relevant.
This component provides a basis for cooperation on perplexing
criminal issues such as trans-border crime, money laundering, and
the movement of illegal immigrants.
Since the formation of the EMP, several developments in the area
of security cooperation are noteworthy. First, the members have ap-
proved and adopted a number of confidence-building measures. For
instance, concrete planning is underway for the creation of a network
of political and security correspondents."' Additionally, work will
soon begin on the completion of human rights and weapons invento-
ries-members already exchange senior political and military offi-
cers. Furthermore, members are organizing civil and military coop-
eration machinery for use in regional disasters. "
Second, serious discussions on a plan of action covering six sig-
nificant areas are underway. These areas include the strengthening of
democracy, preventative diplomacy, security and confidence build-
ing, disarmament, terrorism, and organized crime. The regions are
designing this plan to be very comprehensive and cover a wide range
aims to create a "common area of peace and stability").
15 See Islam, supra note 12 (commenting that the EMP embraces civil soci-
ety).
16. See id. (identifying the establishment of a free trade zone).
17. See EU/Mediterranean States: Coininission Practices.for Euro-Afed Con-
ference, supra note 3 (stating that the Barcelona Declaration complemented the
initiatives of the EMP).
18. See Islam, supra note 14 (discussing attempts at the Barcelona Conference
to improve efforts in the area of security cooperation).
19. See id.
1999]
AM. U. INT' L. REV.
of security issues that affects both regions. Until then, the parties are
creating an Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability.2°
This Charter will create an institutional dialogue and crisis preven-
tion mechanism as the cornerstone of the EMP's political and secu-
rity dimension. Moreover, in September 1996, the parties inaugu-
rated joint information and training measures for diplomats from
partnership countries." These measures will continue throughout
1998, when an electronic information network linking their foreign
ministries is planned.
Third, crime prevention and detection is another area under devel-
opment.22 The EMP agreement provides for the identification of ex-
tremist groups and closer cooperation in drug trafficking. Some
speculate that this may lead to a new military arrangement between
the parties, at least in terms of security and police personnel ex-
change. The future of such security arrangements is open for debate.
Proponents argue that it is time that European and Mediterranean
countries take control over their own defense and begin to play a
greater role preventing and detecting criminal activity in their own
territories. Opponents argue that the United States and other world
powers must be included in these agreements. These critics point to
20. See Conclusions of December 6 General Affairs Council, REUTER EUR.
COMMUNITY REP. (Dec. 6, 1996), available in Lexis, INTLAW Library, EU Cases,
Legislation and News File (describing the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace
and Stability as a general framework for the confidence and security building
measures contemplated by the Barcelona Declaration); see also Marin Memo on
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP. (Nov. 27,
1996), available in Lexis, INTLAW Library, EU Cases, Legislation and News File
(characterizing the Euro-Mediterranean Charter as the institutional dialogue and
crisis-prevention mechanism that will form the cornerstone for cooperation on po-
litical and security measures between EMP members).
21. See Marin Memo on Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, REUTER EUR.
COMMUNITY REP. (Nov. 27, 1996), available in Lexis, INTLAW Library, EU
Cases, Legislation and News File (discussing the commencement of information
and training programs for diplomats from the twenty-seven EMP countries and
noting that next year an electronic information network will link their foreign
ministries); see also Implementation of Barcelona Declaration, REUTER EUR.
COMMUNITY REP. (Apr. 3, 1997), available in Lexis, INTLAW Library, EU Cases,
Legislation and News File (providing information on a workshop for European and
Mediterranean diplomats to share cultural information).
22. See EU/Mediterranean States: Commission Priorities for Euro-Med Con-
ference, supra note 3 (mentioning that EMP members hope to encourage coopera-
tion to combat serious criminal activity).
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the Bosnian situation as an example of the European Union's weak-
ness in dealing with international breaches of security.
C. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
International organized crime-in particular international car theft,
illegal trade in women, children, drugs and weaponry, and money
laundering-especially in the new democracies of Central and East-
ern Europe ("CEE"), poses an increasing threat to Western Europe.
The proximity and easy access between CEE and the European Un-
ion mean that discussions of increased police cooperation within the
European Union must address specific considerations emanating
from CEE.
In many ways, CEE has initiated integration into Western Euro-
pean efforts of police cooperation. For instance, many CEE States
such as the Baltic States, Hungary, Poland, and Russia are already
members of Interpol.23 Such cooperation plays a major role where it
advances the harmonization of police work, at least at the operational
level. Additionally, some Member States of the European Union are
making efforts to reorganize, train, and equip police forces in CEE.
In doing so, these States have made an effort to expand the Western
European model of policing into CEE. Because of these efforts, co-
operation between Eastern and Western Europe in the field of inter-
national policing has a solid foundation. Actual achievements in the
field of increased police cooperation in Western Europe have been
made possible by the gradual process of economic and political uni-
fication brought by the European Union-these achievements com-
plement the corresponding processes of democratization and consti-
tutional state-building.
If the European Union expands eastward and offers memberships
to countries of CEE, these countries will have a greater role to play
in the European Union's existing mechanisms for trans-border police
cooperation. Specifically, the Europol Convention provides that,
"[t]his Convention shall be open to accession by any state that be-
comes a member of the European Union."2' As increasing numbers
23. See den Boer & Walker, supra note 3, at 4-5 (discussing the history of In-
terpol).
24. See Convention Based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on
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of CEE States become members of the European Union, police co-
operation and harmonization with CEE States should take place in an
international political framework. The Council of Europe is one
European Union forum. Basing the harmonization of police coopera-
tion in CEE upon an established legal framework would ensure a
higher level of cooperation in the field. It might also lead to greater
human rights protections and the facilitation of information ex-
change.
D. INTERNATIONAL AND MULTILATERAL EFFORTS
Interpol is the oldest wide-scale mechanism for international po-
lice cooperation. Before World War I, international police coopera-
tion was primarily viewed as a means of combating radical and vio-
lent political opponents. 5 States were only willing to cooperate on
common police and security interests to the extent that their individ-
ual sovereignty remained intact. As such, they organized Interpol as
a private international association of police chiefs, not as a means of
true interstate cooperation.
Since World War II, Interpol has become more of an international
public institution, although several of its defining characteristics re-
main in place. For instance, Interpol's organization is not based upon
an international treaty. In addition, Interpol is not embedded in an
international political structure such as the United Nations or the
Council of Europe. 6 Instead, Interpol is comprised of National Cen-
tral Bureaux, which are organized around a General Secretariat
'7
based in Lyon, France, and provides a far-reaching communications
network for the exchange of criminal intelligence and other impor-
tant information between its members.
the Establishment of a European Police Office, 1995 O.J. (C 95) 316/01 [hereinaf-
ter Europol Convention] (discussing the relationship between the Europol and the
European Union).
25. See generally R.B. Jensen, The International Anti-Anarchist Conference of
1889 and the Origins of Interpol, 16 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 323 (1981) (surveying the
historical foundations of Interpol).
26. See MALCOLM ANDERSON ET AL., POLICING THE EUROPEAN UNION 52
(1995).




There are a number of positive aspects to the internal structure and
organization of Interpol. For instance, it has a large membership.2'
Additionally, Interpol includes States from a number of different le-
gal, political, and ideological backgrounds, including those from op-
posing regimes.
Nonetheless, there are multiple negative aspects of Interpol. First,
the organization has a reputation for a relatively low level of security
in matters such as terrorism.9 Second, Interpol can only be effective
when the participating States are willing to cooperate and fully en-
gage in the activities of the organization. Some Member States lack a
complete commitment to Interpol.'
II. EUROPEAN EFFORTS AT TRANSNATIONAL
POLICE COOPERATION
The European Union provides an extremely useful vehicle for the
study of international police cooperation. In the European Union, an
unprecedented level of cooperation exists between the Member
States. At the same time, a number of factors have stalled the speed
and the extent to which cooperation has taken place.
The most significant factor in this regard is the concern of the
Member States over the possible loss of sovereignty in the fields of
law enforcement and criminal justice." While there is a recognized
need for increased police cooperation, countries are wary of specific
courses of action. Therefore, developments have been piecemeal
rather than comprehensive. Organizations, structures, and procedures
for increased police cooperation in the European Union have evolved
incrementally in order to cope with new circumstances and the reti-
28. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 51 (stating that 176 States are In-
terpol members).
29. See den Boer & Walker, supra note 3, at 4-5. (attributing low security lev-
els to "bureaucratic inertia").
30. See id. (noting that Interpol's effectiveness directly depends on the level of
mutual trust and shared priorities among members).
31. See Julian J.E. Schutte, The European Market of 1993: Test for a Regional
Model of Supranational Criminal Justice or of Interregional Cooperation in
Criminal Law, 3 CRIM. L.F. 55, 56 (1991) (describing the long-held belief that
criminal law and procedure are the sole province of Member States).
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cence of some Member States to engage in increasingly profound
levels of cooperation.
Although police cooperation is not the primary impetus for the
close relationships of the Member States of the European Union, it is
an area of increasing international concern and attention. In addition
to concerns about increasing international crime and terrorism, the
general support for increased European integration, infrastructure fa-
cilitation, and growing trust between the Member States of the Euro-
pean Union all facilitate greater police cooperation. Recent years
have brought a number of notable developments in the field of in-
creased police cooperation within the European Union.3'
A. TREvI
During the early 1970s, many European Member States were con-
fronted with acts of terrorism perpetrated by both European and non-
European groups. At the time, some States realized that Interpol was
a largely ineffective mechanism for dealing with international ter-
rorism. First, Article 3 of the Interpol Constitution states that "[i]t is
strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention
on activities of a political, military, religious or racial character."
Second, the ambiguous legal position of Interpol does not provide an
effective mechanism for dealing with such problems. These factors
combined to show Europeans the greater need for enhanced regional
police cooperation.
Criticisms of the political nature of Interpol led the Council of
Ministers, in December 1975, to establish one of the earliest founda-
tions of international police cooperation in the European Union-
Trevi. 34 The origination of the term Trevi is widely disputed, but
many believe it is an acronym for "Terrorism, Radicalism,
32. See den Boer & Walker, supra note 3, at 3-8 (giving an overview of recent
developments in the field of international policing).
33. INTERPOL, THE CONSTITUTION AND GENERAL REGULATIONS OF THE ICPO-
INTERPOL art. 3 (1956); see also Lara A. Ballard, Comment, The Recognition and
Enforcement of International Criminal Court Judgments in U.S. Courts, 29
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 143, 205 (1997) (asserting that "Interpol, despite its
popular mythology, is a private, largely unregulated organization whose members
have no authority either to issue binding warrants, to make arrests, or even to con-
duct on-site investigations without the consent of the host state").
34. See den Boer & Walker, supra note 3, at 6-7 (detailing the history of
Trevi).
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believe it is an acronym for "Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and
Violence International. ' 5 The Trevi members are the European Un-
ion Member States. In addition, "friends of Trevi"-Canada, Mo-
rocco, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States-attend meetings
as observers. The initial objective of Trevi was to provide a basis for
greater European cooperation to combat international terrorism. Over
the years, however, the organization has begun to focus on drug traf-
ficking and other types of serious organized crimes.
Trevi consists of a hierarchical structure that operates at three dif-
ferent levels. At the highest level of the organization are the minis-
ters, who are responsible for policing and internal security matters in
their respective States. These ministers maintain overall responsibil-
ity for Trevi 6 At the middle level is the Trevi group of senior offi-
cials, consisting of senior civil servants, and occasionally senior po-
lice officers. The task of this group is to provide police advice. At the
lowest level are a number of working groups that consist of civil ser-
vants, police officers, and occasionally representatives from relevant
organizations.37
Established in May, 1977, the Terrorism Working Group facili-
tates concerted European action against terrorism." This group's
primary duty is to analyze information held on known and suspected
terrorist groups, paying particular attention to their strategies and
tasks. Furthermore, the group communicates information through
Trevi's own secure communications network regarding practical se-
curity procedures as well as information about crime scene proce-
dures following terrorist incidents.'9
35. See JOHN BENYON ET AL., POLICE COOPERATION IN EUROPE: AN
INVESTIGATION 152 (1993).
36. See den Boer & Walker, supra note 3, at 6 (describing the origins and
structure of Trevi).
37. See id.
38. See John Benyon et al., Understanding Police Cooperation in Europe: Set-
ting a Framework for Analysis, in POLICING ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES 46,
59 (Malcolm Anderson & Monica den Boer eds., 1994).
39. Malcolm Anderson, The Agenda for Police Cooperation, in POLICING
ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, supra note 38, at 3, 12 (discussing the opera-
tional role of the Terrorism Working Group).
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Established at the same time as the Terrorism Working Group, the
second Trevi working group is the Technical Forum.4' This group is
responsible for promoting police cooperation and exchanging infor-
mation on a number of issues including police training, public order,
police equipment, forensic science, and other scientific and technical
matters, and football hooliganism.
The third working group, entitled Serious Organized International
Crime Group, was established in June 1985 to coordinate activities
against serious crime.4 ' The Group works in four different areas.
First, the drug trafficking unit concentrates on drug liaison offices
posted in drug producer and transit countries. This division also
agreed that each country would establish a National Drugs Intelli-
gence Unit, and the European Community would establish a Euro-
pean Drugs Intelligence Unit. The creation of Europol will accom-
plish the latter objective.
The second division of the Serious International Organized Crime
Group assists in harmonizing police activities and promoting inter-
national initiatives against money laundering. Since its inception, it
has worked with the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the
Financial Action Task Force to accomplish its goals.
The Environmental Crime Group is the third division of the Seri-
ous Organized International Crime Working Group.4 This division
works to understand and reduce incidents of environmental crime.
The fourth division of the third working group is European Crime
Analysis.45 The mandate of this organization is to analyze crime in
Member States, developing a comparative approach. This division
seeks to develop techniques to solve particular crimes or series of
crimes, as well as to foster general crime prevention.
40. See Benyon et al., supra note 38, at 59.
41. See id. at 59-60.






The fourth Trevi Working Group, entitled Trevi 1992, existed ex-
clusively between December 1988 and December 1992.' The tempo-
rary Group dealt with political topics relating to the policing and na-
tional security implications of reduced national border controls. It
was also designed to examine measures that could be introduced to
compensate for the relaxation of the internal frontier.
Trevi has been subject to a number of criticisms. The primary cri-
tique relates to the secrecy surrounding Trevi's operations. Some in-
dividuals and organizations have suggested that Trevi is too secretive
and disconnected from other European Union institutions."' In addi-
tion, Trevi's internal structure often prevents the working groups
from acting in a cohesive manner. For example, in certain cases,
Trevi working groups have been unaware of the activities of the
other Trevi working groups.4 5
Some of these criticisms could be resolved, however, if Trevi op-
erated within European Community institutions. If the activities of
Trevi were formally and explicitly located within the European
Community's political process, increased legitimacy and less distrust
of the organization would result.
A number of other obstacles to Trevi's progress are apparent. For
instance, Trevi operates at the intergovernmental, political, and sen-
ior official levels and may not be taking sufficient account of micro-
level law enforcement responsibility. In addition, the Trevi structure
is inefficient, since the group does not have a permanent location or
secretariat. Finally, stymieing Trevi's accountability is its lack of a
legitimate structure for policymaking or executive action. Because of
this, a certain suspicion often accompanies any evaluation of Trevi's
merits.
46. See Benyon et al., supra note 38, at 60.
47. See id. at 61 (stating the criticisms leveled at Trevi raise doubts about its
democratic accountability and political legitimacy).
48. See id. (identifying the structure of Trevi as leading to decreased account-
ability).
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B. THE MAASTRICHT TREATY-PROGRESS TOWARDS GREATER
POLICE COOPERATION
The Maastricht Treaty made significant contributions to the devel-
opment of police cooperation within Europe by adding the third pil-
lar of "Cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. 49 Inso-
far as the objective of recognizing matters of common interest is
concerned, the document offers relatively little guidance. The Maas-
tricht Treaty words this objective vaguely: "[F]or the purpose of
achieving the objectives of the Union, in particular the free move-
ment of persons."" Given this very broad starting point, it is not en-
tirely clear what are the intended missions of the third pillar. How-
ever, the third pillar can be considered as being more than a sum of
its provisions. It is a strong symbol of the growing realization that
international crime within the European Union's territory should be
dealt with on a supranational level. The development of the third
pillar represents a major accomplishment in the transfer of criminal
justice matters to the main core of the European Union.
Including matters of European Union transnational police coop-
eration into the third pillar of Maastricht Treaty" served to reinforce
a number of issues that had been of common interest among the
Member States for some time. 2 These common interests include:
(1) asylum policy; (2) rules governing the crossing by person of the exter-
nal borders of the Member States and the exercise of controls thereon; (3)
immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries; (4)
combating drug addiction; (5) combating fraud on an international scale;
(6) judicial cooperation in civil matters; (7) judicial cooperation in crimi-
nal matters; (8) customs cooperation; and finally (9) police cooperation
49. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, art. K.
50. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, art. K. 1.
51. See id.; see also Peter-Christian Mijller-Graff, The Legal Basis of the Third
Pillar and its Position in the Framework of the Union Treaty, 31 J. COMMON MKT.
STUD. 493, 493-94 (1994).
52. Monica den Boer, Europe and the Art of International Police Co-
operation: Free Fall or Measured Scenario?, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE
MAASTRICHT TREATY 279, 281 (David O'Keefe & Patrick Twoney eds., 1994)




for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug
trafficking and other serious forms of international 
crime.f
While the first three areas have certain implications of international
police cooperation, numbers four through nine have broader reaching
implications.
The general authority to pursue the policies of the third pillar rests
with the Member States, as provided in Article K. 1." The Maastricht
Treaty only specifically provides that the Member States shall regard
the identified areas as matters of common interest," shall consult one
another within the Council with a view toward coordinating their ac-
tion," and shall collaborate among the relevant administrative de-
partments. 7
The individual Member States will largely decide how affairs un-
der the third pillar proceed. The Council has no power to initiate any
measure in this area. Even if the Council unanimously decided to ap-
ply Article 100(c)" to action in the areas of the third pillar, it remains
the providence of the Member States to adopt that decision in accor-
dance with their respective constitutions.59 In addition, the possibility
for initiative by the Commission is also limited. For the Council to
consider action depends on the initiation of action by at least one
Member State. This requirement exists only in the areas of police and
53. Muller-Graf, supra note 51, at 493-94 (providing a detailed overview of the
third pillar's objectives); see Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, art. K. 1 (referencing
the Treaty's acknowledgement of areas of common interest).
54. See Hans Ulrich Jessurun D'Oliveira, Expanding Exiernal and Shrinking
Internal Borders: Europe's Defense Mechanisms in the Area of Free Movement,
Immigration and Asylum, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRiCHT TREATY, supra
note 52, at 261, 263 (describing the Maastricht Treaty as a victory by the Member
States over the Commission).
55. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, art. K. 1.
56. See id. art. K.3.
57. See id.
58. See id. art. 100(c).
59. See id. art. K.9 (providing that Member States should conform to their re-
spective constitutional amendments).
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customs cooperation, and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. In
all other areas, the Commission can take initiative on its own.'
While the third pillar expands the possibilities for international
police cooperation, it also includes a number of safeguards. With re-
spect to criminal justice cooperation, Article K.2 provides that ac-
tivities employed in the framework of Title VI of the Treaty-Provi-
sions on cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs-
must comply with the European Convention on Human Rights6' and
the Geneva Convention on Refugees.62
Article K.5 is another important provision included in the Maas-
tricht Treaty, providing that Member States must defend a common
position with international organizations and conferences.63 This pro-
vision implies that the European Union must present a united front
on issues such as money laundering or drugs in front of international
bodies such as the United Nations.
Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty extends the scope of cross-border
law enforcement. Before the Maastricht Treaty, there was almost an
exclusive focus upon information exchange in terms of police coop-
eration. Under the Maastricht Treaty, however, the focus has shifted
to greater levels of cooperation. Title VI also emphasizes questions
of legal and democratic accountability through mechanisms such as
data protection and transparency of action. If the matters under Title
VI are developed significantly, and become fully accepted and inte-
grated, the inclusion of Title VI in the Maastricht Treaty will be re-
garded as an important accomplishment in the integration process.
Despite its potential contributions, Title VI remains of question-
able overall value. This is partly due to its mixed construction. Spe-
cifically, it addresses many issues that are clearly connected to other
parts of the Maastricht Treaty. One such example concerns combat-
60. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, arts. K.3, K.9 (referencing the Com-
mission's ability to initiate action).
61. European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
62. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150, amended by Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
63. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, art. K.5 (stating that Member States
are responsible for safeguarding the internal security of the European Union).
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ing drug addiction,' which, although covered by Title VI, is also
linked with European Union health policy.'5
C. THE SCHENGEN AGREEMENT
The Schengen Agreement ("Schengen" or "'Agreement"),"' signed
on June 14, 1985, created another level of cooperation within the
criminal justice sector.67 The formation of Schengen acknowledged
the need to abolish obstacles to the free movement of goods and per-
sons. A fundamental component of the Schengen system was the
eventual abolition of controls at all borders between participating
States.68 Specifically, the Agreement provides detailed measures for
the abolition of checks at internal borders, movement of persons, po-
lice, and security, the Schengen Information System ("SIS"), " trans-
port and movement of goods,0 protection of personal data," and
standardized definitions. 7
In addition to reducing border controls, the Schengen Agreement
also provides for a higher level of police cooperation among its con-
tracting States.73 Particularly, the Agreement provides for the ex-
change of information, operational cooperation such as cross-border
64. See id. art. K. 1.4.
65. See id. art. 129(1)(c) (linking the Maastricht Treaty with European Union
health policy).
66. See Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their
Common Borders and the Convention Applying the Agreement, Jan. 19, 1991,
Belg.-Fr.-F.R.G.-Lux.-Neth, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 68, 69, 73, 84 [in four parts]
[hereinafter Schengen Convention] (Schengen Agreement concluded June 14,
1985; Schengen Convention concluded June 19, 1990).
67. See id. arts. 39-47 (establishing methods for police cooperation among the
Schengen signatories). See generally CHANTAL JOU13ERT & HANS BEVERS,
SCHENGEN INVESTIGATED 33-38 (1996) (providing background and analysis on the
Schengen Convention).
68. See Schengen Convention, supra note 66, arts. 2-38 (establishing guide-
lines for the movement of persons across internal and external borders, the issu-
ance of visas, and the responsibility for visa application processing).
69. See id. arts. 92-119.
70. See id. arts. 120-25.
71. See id. arts. 126-30.
72. See id. art. 1.
73. See id. arts. 39-91.
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observations, cross-border pursuit, controlled delivery, and the legal
position of police officers during these operations. Additionally pro-
vided for are the installation of telephone, radio, and telex lines, and
the provision of liaison officers to police authorities of the contract-
ing parties.74
Two of the aforementioned articles on police cooperation are par-
ticularly important. Article 39 of the Schengen Agreement obligates
police agencies in Schengen States to render mutual assistance in
providing information upon request for the prevention or detection of
criminal offenses. 75 This is only possible, however, to the extent that
national legislation permits. In addition, Article 46 permits the free
exchange of information that may help to prevent future crimes or
threats to public order.76 Taken together, these two articles provide
the basis for a much higher level of cooperation among the police
authorities of different contracting States.
A notable part of the Schengen Agreement concerns its provisions
on data and information." The Agreement represents the most broad-
based effort thus far to establish a pan-European police communica-
tions system. It includes measures on cross-border surveillance, "hot
pursuit," the powers of questioning and arrest, and carrying firearms
to a foreign territory.78 It also enables national police and customs
authorities to access information on missing or wanted persons, indi-
viduals refused entry, and stolen and embezzled property."
The SIS has important technical features. Each contracting party
has a National Schengen Information System ("NSIS"), which is a
national data depository. A central unit in Strasbourg, France con-
74. See Schengen Convention, supra note 66, arts. 39-91.
75. See id. art. 39 (discussing the Schengen's allowance for mutual assistance).
76. See id. art. 46(2) (stating that information exchange should be facilitated
without prejudice).
77. See Julian J.E. Schutte, Schengen: Its Meaning for the Free Movement of
Persons in Europe, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 549, 559 (1991) (referring to the
Schengen Information System ("SIS") as the "most spectacular novelty" of the
Schengen Convention).
78. See Schengen Convention, supra note 66, arts. 40-41, 48-49,.
79. See id. art. 92(1) (providing for the establishment and maintenance of the
sis).
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nects all NSIS's to each other, as well as copies and distributes all
data. Collectively, these two components comprise the SIS.
The SIS provides border officials ready access to the criminal rec-
ords of anyone within the contracting State. As such, the SIS pro-
vides enormous assistance in preventing and detecting crime. "Two
days after the new accords went into effect, German police reported
that they had already arrested thirty-five people at the country's bor-
ders, among them a Russian driving a stolen car and a Turk wanted
for murder in the Netherlands."'' 0 It is very likely that information
provided by the SIS facilitated many of these arrests.
At the same time, the SIS has been subject to a number of criti-
cisms due to its comprehensive nature-including its potential for
violating the privacy rights of the European citizen. Another concern
about the Schengen system is that actual movement within the terri-
tory may become more restricted because of the SIS's reporting
mechanism. Due to the fact that a person's right to enter and reside in
the Schengen territory depends upon the domestic laws of each con-
tracting State, the potential exists for curtailed freedom of movement
within the single market.' Thus, if one contracting State decides that
a person is inadmissible under domestic law, and reports this person
to the SIS, the entire Schengen area becomes inaccessible to that per-
son." It is likely that criteria of personae non-gratae, common to all
contracting States, will develop to combat this difficulty."
80. Serge Jaquet, Moving Ahead As One, in INTERNATIONAL REVIEW: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF WORLD EVENTS (on file with American Universi , Inter-
national Law Review).
81. See JOUBERT & BEVERS, supra note 67, at 36 (emphasizing the irony in the
potential for Eastern European citizens to be prohibited from entering Western
European territories given the harsh criticism leveled by the West at Communist
Eastern Europe for restricting population movement).
82. See Martin Baldwin-Edwards & Bill Hebenton, Will SIS Be Europe's Big
Brother?, in POLICING ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES 137, 154 (Malcolm An-
derson & Monica den Boers eds., 1994) (noting that Schengen has a system of cu-
mulative controls where its reporting mechanism .vill categorize an offender of one
State's laws as an offender of Schengen's security, regardless of whether the of-
fender could be held criminally liable in any other contracting State).
83. David O'Keefe, The Schengen Convention: A Suitable Model For Euro-
pean Iztegration?, 11 Y.B. EUR. L. 185, 191-92 (1991) (emphasizing that when
one contracting State imposes more stringent immigration standards, the standards
must be enforced by every other contracting State).
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An additional concern is the Schengen requirement for abolition of
border controls on people at all internal borders of the States in the
European Union that are party to the agreement. Traditionally
viewed as a mechanism for protecting internal security, the abolition
of border controls necessarily creates a number of profound implica-
tions for policing. 4
First, the abolition of border controls may encourage the growth of
transnational crime. If it is true that border controls protect the secu-
rity of States, then the abolition of borders may facilitate the move-
ment of international criminals and criminal activity across State
borders. Increased police cooperation will be necessary to track and
monitor international criminals as they move freely among contract-
ing States.
Second, the absence of border controls mandated by Schengen will
likely cause a shift from external to internal criminal controls. Since
police authorities will no longer be monitoring the borders, they may
be required to undertake increased monitoring and investigation
within the country itself. An over-eagerness in conducting internal
investigations targeting individual citizens may lead to charges of
discrimination and harassment against officers. This will require the
police to be more selective in their investigation activities, especially
when identifying and interrogating suspects.
Third, the full growth of Schengen may be impeded by a lack of
full participation by the contracting States. The current members of
Schengen include Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Five other States, Austria
Denmark, Finland, Greece, and Sweden have joined Schengen, but
have not yet fully implemented the agreement and eliminated all
controls at their borders, although Austria is likely to achieve this fi-
nal step in the near future.
In December 1997, Austria announced the implementation of the
Schengen Agreement." The country will lift all customs and immi-
84. See generally Schutte, supra note 77, at 568-70 (discussing some negative
aspects of "Schengenizing" the law in the European Community on the free
movement of people).
85. See Austria Joins Schengen Group, AEROSPACE DAILY, Dec. 8, 1997, at
405 (stating that Austria will abolish border controls for passengers traveling
among European Union Member Countries); Austria Joins Schengen Accord on
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gration controls with Schengen contracting States. Of the eight
countries with which Austria shares a border, only Germany and It-
aly are Schengen members. Germany's criticisms of Austria for not
controlling illegal immigration, particularly from Eastern Europe,
have delayed the eradication of Austria's border controls. Because of
German concerns, however, Austrian authorities have stepped up
controls and reinforced surveillance at the nation's borders."'
Likewise, although Greece signed Schengen in 1992, it has only
recently adopted Schengen provisions eliminating border controls.'
The country's delay has largely been the result of technical difficul-
ties in restricting the entry of illegal immigrants into the numerous
islands that comprise Greece's southern border.'
Denmark, Finland, and Sweden's relationship with the other Nor-
dic countries, including Norway, a country not part of the European
Union, complicates their efforts to participate in Schengen. Specifi-
cally, the countries assert that full participation Schengen is hindered
by membership in the Nordic Union, which provides for free move-
ment between the Scandinavian countries."
Ireland and the United Kingdom have not yet joined Schengen.
Like the members of the Nordic Union, Ireland and the United King-
dom share a Common Travel Area. Additionally, the two nations ar-
Free EU Movement, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 1, 1997 (stating that controls
on Austria's common border with Italy and Germany are to be removed by
March).
86. See German Official Slans Three-Country Border Accord, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, July 18, 1997 (expressing doubts that Austria could stop illegal
immigrants from crossing its 810-mile border with Eastern Europe).
87. Greece to Adopt EU Border Pact Despite Opposition, REUTER EUR.
COMMUNITY REP. (June 10, 1997), available in Lexis, INTLAW Library, EU
Cases, Legislation and News File (describing a protest outside the Greek Parlia-
ment where Schengen border controls were being debated and noting that, protests
notwithstanding, the Greek Parliament would pass the necessary legislation).
88. See Martin Walker & Alan Travis, Analysis: Schengen Europe: Losers in
the Game Without Frontiers, GUARDIAN (London). Jan. 7, 1998, available in 1998
WL 3072662 (noting that much of Greece's coastline has proven virtually impos-
sible to police).
89. See Schengen Pact Spreads Wings, REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP. (Dec.
19, 1996), available in Lexis, INTLAW Library, EU Cases, Legislation and News
File (observing that Denmark, Finland, and Sweden might not implement Schen-
gen provisions until the year 2000).
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gue that their sea borders act as a barrier against international crimi-
nal transaction and movement, and present obstacles to full partici-
pation in Schengen. 90
Finally, there have been some practical concerns associated with
Schengen. Significantly, the contracting States worry about the cost
associated with the changes that Schengen necessitates. If the Euro-
pean Union expands eastward to include States from CEE, it may be
very difficult for those States to meet the costs associated with
Schengen. For example, current contracting States have found it nec-
essary to invest in costly modem technology such as passport scan-
ners and other sophisticated computerized equipment designed
quickly to identify forgeries and stolen license plates.
D. EUROPOL
In January, 1994, Member States established the Europol Drugs
Unit91 as Europol's first phase. 9 Currently, Europol is limited to re-
laying information between national police in Member States on
drug crimes and money laundering, but officials expect the organiza-
tion's role to grow. Once fully established, Europol will broaden the
scope of police cooperation between the Member States of the Euro-
pean Union at a rapid pace. It is likely that such a change will lead to
cooperation that is far beyond the limits of Interpol and the former
Trevi.
90. See Jeremy Gaunt, Dutch See EU Border Pact With Norway, Not Britain,
REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP. (Feb. 10, 1997), available in Lexis, INTLAW Li-
brary, EU Cases, Legislation and News File (reporting that "sovereignty and secu-
rity-conscious Britain says it has no intention of lifting its border controls"). Ire-
land, because of its open border with Britain, cannot join Schengen unless Britain
does so. See id.
91. See Joint Action of March 10, 1995 adopted by the Council on the Basis of
Art. K3 of the Treaty on European Union Concerning the Europol Drugs Unit,
1995 O.J. (L 62) 1, 3 (1995) (noting that Member States have a provisional frame-
work for cooperation in the Europol Drug Unit). This agreement replaced the June
2, 1993, Ministerial Agreement on the Establishment of the Europol Drugs Unit.
See id. art. 8.
92. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 64, 66-67 (explaining that the Eu-
ropol Drug Unit was established as Europol's first phase in dealing with the prob-
lems caused by international illicit drug trafficking, associated money laundering,
and organized crime).
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Germany originally advocated the creation of Europol,"' suggest-
ing two bases for its foundation. First, Europol should serve as a
center for the exchange of information and experience. Second,
Member States of the European Union should eventually grant Euro-
pol "original powers" to operate within the Member States. 4 Partici-
pants at the Maastricht Summit in December 1991 formally adopted
Germany's proposal,95 and recognized Europol in the Maastricht
Treaty under the newly developed title of Justice and Home Affairs.'
Passed in 1995, 9' Articles K.3(2)(c) and K.l(9) of the Maastricht
Treaty provide the basis for the Europol Convention." Article
K.3(2)(c) provides that:
The Council may on the initiative of any Member State, in the areas re-
ferred to in Article K. 1 (7) to (9): without prejudice to Article 220 of the
Treaty establishing the European Community, draw up conventions which
it shall recommend to the Member States for adoption in accordance with
their respective constitutional requirements.
As providing a basis for the establishment of Europol, this provi-
sion needs to be read along with Article K. 1 (9). This article provides,
as an objective of the union that:
police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terror-
ism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international
93. See Cyrille Fijnaut, The hIternationalization of Police Cooperation in
Western Europe, in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF POLICE COOPERATION IN
WEsTERN EUROPE 9, 14 (Cyrille Fijnaut ed., 1993) (crediting the Germans for
pushing debate in Europe for the past twenty years with respect to a new police in-
stitution-police cooperation mechanism).
94. See id. at 15 (noting that it was predictable that some Member States would
resist the proposal granting "original powers" to Europol).
95. See den Boer & Walker, supra note 3, at 7.
96. See id. (asserting that Europol is now embedded within a fortifying regula-
tory context).
97. See Europol Convention, supra note 24 (indicating that Europol was passed
on July 26, 1995 in Brussels).
98. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, art. K.3(c) (discussing that the Council
may draw up conventions which it shall recommend to the Member States for
adoption); id. art. K.l(9) (noting that Member States shall police cooperation con-
cerning certain areas of international crime as a matter of common interest).
99. Id. art. K.3(2)(c).
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crime, including if necessary certain aspects of customs cooperation, in
connection with the organization of a Union-wide system for exchanging
information within a European Police Office (Europol).'0°
Article 2 of the Europol Convention lists the main objectives of
Europol.' °' The primary objective of Europol is improving the effec-
tiveness and cooperation of Member States in the prevention and
combatment of terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking, and other seri-
ous forms of international crime. '0 To accomplish its primary objec-
tive, Europol has five principal tasks: (a) to facilitate the exchange of
information between Member States; °3 (b) to obtain, collate, and
analyze information and intelligence, " (c) to notify the competent
authorities of the Member States of information concerning them,
and of any connections identified between criminal offenses; '°' (d) to
aid investigations in Member States by forwarding all relevant in-
formation; '3 and (e) to maintain a computerized system of data col-
lection and information.
0 7
The first provision of Article 2 requires that Member States coop-
erate with one another when two factors are present. First, there must
be factual indications that an organized criminal structure is in-
volved. Second, the forms of crime in question must affect two or
more Member States in such a way that requires a common ap-
proach.0 8
100. Id. art. K.l(9).
101. See Europol Convention, supra note 24, art. 2 (setting forth the main ob-
jectives of Europol).
102. See id. art. 2(1) (stating that the main objective of Europol is to improve the
effectiveness and cooperation of Member States authorities in preventing interna-
tional crime).
103. See id. art. 3(1)(1).
104. See id. at3(1)(2).
105. See id. art. 3(1)(3).
106. See id. art. 3(l)(4).
107. See Europol Convention, supra note 24, art. 3(1)(5) (noting that a comput-
erized data system is to be maintained in accordance with Articles 8, 10, and 11 ).
108. See id. art. 2(1) (indicating that the scale, significance, and consequences of
the criminal activity must warrant a cooperative approach by Member States).
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The second provision of Article 2 describes the progressive man-
date of Europol. t 9 Initially Europol will act in the fields of unlawful
drug trafficking, trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances,
illegal immigrant smuggling, trade in human beings, and motor vehi-
cle crime. " ° Europol's competence also extends to illegal money
laundering activities in connection with the aforementioned crimes,"
or specific manifestations thereof, as well as related criminal of-
fenses.l"2
Within two years of the latest entry into force of the Convention,
Europol's authority will expand to cover "crimes committed or likely
to be committed in the course of terrorist activities against life, limb,
personal freedom or property."" If, however, the Council acts
unanimously in accordance with procedure in Title VI of the Maas-
tricht Treaty, the Council may instruct Europol to deal with terrorist
activities or other forms of crime at an earlier date."'
To effect these provisions, Member States have certain duties un-
der the Europol Convention. Each Member State is required to have
a national unit charged with seven main tasks.": According to Article
4, the national units must:
(1) supply Europol on their own initiative with the information n intelli-
gence necessary for it to carry out its tasks; (2) respond to Europol's re-
quests for information, intelligence and advice; (3) keep information and
intelligence up to date; (4) evaluate information an intelligence in accor-
dance with national law for the competent authorities and transmit this
material to them; (5) issue requests for advice, information and analysis to
Europol; (6) supply Europol with information for storage in the comput-
109. See id. art. 2(2) (describing the initial crime prevention activities of Mem-
ber States, as well as policing activities to begin no later than two years following
the date the Europol Convention enters into force).
110. See id. (explaining when Europol Member States shall act and the types of
activities they can prevent).
111. See id. art. 2(3)(1).
112. See id. art. 2(3)(2).
113. Europol Convention, supra note 24, art. 2(2).
114. See id. (noting that the Council must act unanimously to pursue solutions to
terrorist activities before the statutorily-defined time period expires).
115. See id. art. 4(1).
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erized system; (7) ensure compliance with the law in every exchange of
information between themselves and Europol."
6
Large parts of the duties of the Member States involve the provi-
sion of data. Member States, however, are not required to provide
certain information-particularly in those areas that are deemed to be
tasks of Member States as provided for in Articles 4(4)(1), (2), and
(6)-if doing so would threaten national security interests, jeopardize
the success of a current investigation, endanger individuals, or in-
volve information on certain Member State intelligence activities . 7
A primary component of Europol concerns the development and
maintenance of a computerized system of information." 8 Such a sys-
tem should play a primary role in the collection, analysis, and trans-
fer of data. Article 8 of the Convention describes the content of the
information system as including both personal information as well as
information relating to criminal enterprises and activities."9 The
Convention provides that data entered into the system shall relate to
two categories of people. The first category of people include those
who, in accordance with the concerned Member States' national law,
are suspected of having committed or participated in a criminal of-
fense for which Europol is competent, or who have been convicted of
such an offense. 20 The second category is comprised of persons for
whom there are serious grounds under national law for believing will
commit criminal offenses for which Europol is competent.'2'
If an individual falls into one of the above two categories, the per-
sonal data entered into the Europol system may include: the person's
surname, maiden name, given names, and aliases;'22 the date and
116. See id. art. 4(1)-(7).
117. See id. art. 4(5)(1)-(3).
118. See id. arts. 6-7 (explaining that Europol shall establish and maintain a
computerized system of collected information in order to perform its tasks).
119. See Europol Convention, supra note 24, art. 8 (setting forth the content of
the information system).
120. See id. art. 8 (1)(1).
121. See id. art. 8 (1)(2).
122. See id. art. 8(2)(1).
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place of birth;I2 3 nationality;'' sex;'25 and any other necessary char-
acteristics that will assist in identification.'2 ' In addition to personal
information, data entry may include information relating to suspected
or actual criminal activity. This data may include:
(1) criminal offenses, alleged crimes and when and where they were
committed; (2) means which were or may be used to commit the crimes;
(3) departments handling the case and their filing references; (4) sus-
pected membership of a criminal organization; (5) convictions, where
they relate to criminal offenses for which Europol is competent under Ar-
ticle 2."12
Thus, Europol is authorized to gather, analyze, and share a large
amount and variety of information pertaining to individuals.
Europol's development represents a rather notable accomplish-
ment in the move towards greater international police cooperation
within Europe. The recognition of Justice and Home Affairs as a
separate pillar of European activity' emphasizes that Europol exists
within a firm and well-established supportive regulatory context.' '
This foundation may help advance Europol's work. In addition, un-
der Article K.3 of the Maastricht Treaty, international conventions
may be promulgated under the wide range of affairs provided for in
Article K. 1. "0 This may lead to more systematic regulation in an area
where a certain level of progress has already been accomplished.
Some consider that "following the signing and ratification of a
convention for the establishment of Europol, it is likely that this
123. See id. art. 8(2)(2).
124. See id. art. 8(2)(3).
125. See Europol Convention, supra note 24, art. 8(2)(4).
126. See id. art. 8(2)(5) (noting that other characteristics likely to assist in identi-
fication can include any particular physical characteristics not subject to change).
127. Id. art. 8(3)(2)(1)-(5).
128. See E.P. Wellenstein, Unin-, Conmunir. Union-What's in a Name?, 29
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 205, 209 (1992) (explaining that the construction of three
pillars in the Maastricht Treaty occurred despite the fact that Member States origi-
nally promised "a single institutional framework").
129. See den Boer & Walker, supra note 3, at 7 (reporting that Europol is settled
within a supportive regulatory context).
130. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, art. K.3.
1999]
AM. U. INTL L. REV.
agency will develop into a fully fledged European police office or
agency."' 3' On the other hand, Van Outrive, the rapporteur on Euro-
pol for the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs of the
European Parliament, has argued that "[a]t present we do not have
the political, legal and procedural structures we would need for an
operational European federal police force.""'2 While it is still too
early to decide upon the precise future of Europol, it appears that
Outrive's statement is much more on target for the time being.
In the future, the European Commission will be in a better position
to influence and coordinate the activities of Europol. Additionally,
there will be enhanced opportunities for the European Parliament to
participate legitimately in the development of policy concerning Eu-
ropol. The position and definition of Europol suggests that, in the
future it should take over the role of Interpol within the Member
States of the European Union. If the European Community becomes
more federalized, it is likely that Interpol will eventually hold the
same position in the European Union as it does now in the United
States-as an outside contact point with police in other countries.
E. OTHER BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
BETWEEN MEMBER STATES
A network of treaties, established within the framework of the
Council of Europe, govern traditional inter-State cooperation in
criminal matters between judicial authorities. Although the European
Union is more extensively cooperating in criminal detection and ap-
prehension, these classic agreements remain of considerable impor-
tance and use. The European Convention on Extradition ("Extradi-
tion Convention")'" and the European Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters ("Mutual Assistance Convention")
' 4
enjoy the widest recognition and have the greatest practical impor-
131. Benyon, supra note 38, at 61 (asserting that Europol will promote effective
cooperation).
132. EUR. PARL. DEB. 3-426/281 (Jan. 21, 1993).
133. Dec. 13, 1957, 359 U.N.T.S. 273 [hereinafter Extradition Convention] (set-
ting forth extraditable offenses, as well as rules and procedures governing extradi-
tion).
134. Apr. 20, 1959, 472 U.N.T.S. 185 [hereinafter Mutual Assistance Conven-
tion] (detailing rules in the field of mutual assistance in criminal matters).
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tance. Almost all member States of the Council of Europe have rati-
fied both treaties.
The Extradition Convention imposes a duty to extradite upon
members of the Council. In conformity with tradition, the Extradition
Convention excludes from the duty to extradite political offenses, or
offenses connected with a political offense."5 Extradition may be re-
fused by a State if it has substantial grounds for believing that the re-
quest is a mere pretext for the prosecution or punishment of a person
on account of race, religion, nationality, or political option. More-
over, a State may base refusal to extradite on the substantial belief
that an individual may be prejudiced for any of these reasons.' In
addition, a country may refuse the extradition of nationals, in keep-
ing with continental legal tradition."' Notably, due to the great im-
portance of modem economic crime, fiscal offenses are no longer
generally excluded from the categories of extraditable crimes."'
The Mutual Assistance Convention proceeds from the assumption
that contracting parties are under a basically unrestricted duty to af-
ford one another the widest measure of mutual assistance in criminal
proceedings. '39 The Mutual Assistance Convention no longer requires
the offenses concerned to be punishable under the national law of
both the requesting and the requested State. Reasons for the refusal
of assistance are optional and are contained in a blanket provision
stating that the requested State may refuse assistance if it considers
execution of the request likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security,
or other essential interests. '
A number of bilateral and multilateral agreements between Mem-
ber States have influenced progress towards increased police coop-
eration within Europe. In February 1997, for example, Germany and
135. See Extradition Convention, supra note 133, art. 3(I), 359 U.N.T.S. at 278.
136. See id. art. 3(2), 359 U.N.T.S. at 278.
137. See id. art. 6, 359 U.N.T.S. at 280 (providing individual contracting Parties
the opportunity to define the term "nationals").
138. See id. art. 5, 359 U.N.T.S. at 280 (setting forth that extradition can be
granted for offenses in connection with taxes, duties, customs and exchange).
139. See Mutual Assistance Convention, supra note 134, art. 1(1), 472 U.N.T.S.
at 186 (noting that contracting parties undertake to afford each other the broadest
measure of mutual assistance in criminal proceedings).
140. See id. art 2(b), 472 U.N.T.S. at 192.
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the Netherlands agreed to expand the scope of their police coopera-
tion.' 4' The police forces will engage in joint activities, including as-
sistance in disasters and public events, traffic controls, the apprehen-
sion of criminals, and surveillance. 42 Additionally, the two countries
will improve the exchange of information.'
41
Many other bilateral and multilateral agreements are currently in
existence. These agreements help advance cooperation between
Member States on issues of mutual importance and necessity such as
money laundering, drug trafficking, traffic in persons, traffic in arms,
and the unlawful seizure of aircraft. 44 In many cases, such agree-
ments were created after it was determined that exclusively domestic
efforts had little impact in countering the specific problem."' Such
international problems require international attention.
At the same time, however, such agreements may also impede
progress. Due to the number of agreements, and the diverse issues
they govern, however, there is often confusion about which law con-
trols. Any future development of one system of international police
cooperation will have to adopt an integrated and comprehensive ap-
proach.
141. See Chairmanship of the European Union, Greater Safety Through Coop-
eration Between Dutch and German Police, Press Release, Feb. 5, 1997 (stating
that the safety of inhabitants near the German border will increase as a result of the
agreement between the Netherlands and Germany).
142. See id. (explaining that the joint activities demonstrate that the German and
Dutch police forces will work closely together).
143. See id. (asserting that police investigation and prosecution in Germany and
the Netherlands will be more coordinated and increasingly well-executed due to
the cooperative agreement).
144. See genet-ally MALCOLM ANDERSON, POLICING THE WORLD: INTERPOL
AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL POLICE CO-OPERATION 20-22 (1989) (pro-
viding examples of bilateral and multilateral police initiatives).
145. See id. at 20 (asserting that the increasing wealth of highly industrialized
countries facilitated the growth of international crime thus necessitating the coor-
dination of police efforts on an international scale).
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III. PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM INCREASED
POLICE COOPERATION IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION
A. PROLIFERATION OF POLICE INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS
Although many opportunities exist for the exchange of personal
data in the European Community, no data protection legislation is in
place pertaining to State use of data at the Community level. Instead,
such protection exists only on a national level. These differences cre-
ate a major impediment to the full integration of the European Union
and the protection of the rights of European citizens.
There are also no Community provisions regulating the means of
exchanging police information about individuals within Member
States, or between the European Union and third parties." Rather,
each measure on international police cooperation, ranging from
Schengen to Europol, has its own data protection provisions. No sin-
gle detailed and all-encompassing approach deals with these legiti-
mate concerns. The fact that there are numerous different-and po-
tentially conflicting-provisions on data protection supplements the
already existing confusion over how such information should be
handled.
Of particular concern are non-Europeans within Europe. If the
misuse or abuse of international police data while in Europe victim-
izes such individuals, they might face difficulty in appealing to the
European Court of Human Rights for assistance. Non-Europeans
with limited ties to Europe may face greater obstacles in appealing to
this Court and may thus be subject to greater personal data abuses.
On a more hopeful note, however, certain commentators have argued
that the courts of Europe, including the European Court of Justice
146. See Council of Europe Recommendations to Member States, Recommen-
dation No. R (87) 15 (1987) (regulating the use of personal data in the police sec-
tor). This recommendation provides for a greater level of protection to the person
on whom police data has been compiled. See id. This recommendation is non-
binding, however. See id. Accordingly, Member States are under no specific obli-
gation to comply with it and European citizens do not derive any direct rights from
it. See id.
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have been attempting to include immigrants in Community law to
some extent.
1. The History of European Privacy Protection
When evaluating the various techniques for protecting data that
currently exist within the European Union, it is important to under-
stand the history of privacy protection. One of the first references to
a right of privacy appeared just a little more than one hundred years
ago in Thomas M. Cooley's treatise on the law of torts, wherein
Cooley coined the phrase "the right to be let alone."'47 Subsequently,
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, in an 1890 Harvard Law Review
article, argued that a right of privacy is essential to the individuals
existing in advanced civilizations.4 The article traced the roots of
the right of privacy back to the common law of England.'49 Since
then, a number of domestic laws, as well as international human
rights conventions, have sought to encode this principle of a right to
privacy. "0
Protection of personal data is quite important in an increasingly
global society, particularly one that is heading towards increased co-
operation in the attainment and maintenance of criminal intelligence.
As early as 1981, the Council of Europe adopted Convention 108.
Addressed to the Member States of the Council of Europe, as well as
its non-member States,' 5' Convention 108 has been signed by all
Member States of the European Union.'
5 2
147. THOMAS M. COOLEY, LAW OFTORTS sec. 29 (1st ed. 1880).
148. See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REv. 193, 196 (1890).
149. See id. at 193-95 (describing the evolution of common law protections
against trespass, nuisance, and intellectual property and describing the right to pri-
vacy as the next logical step in that succession).
150. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 71 U.N., art. 12,
U.N. Doc, A/810 (1948). This declaration states that "[n]o one shall be subjected
to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of
the law against such interference or attacks." Id.; see also International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No.
16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
151. See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
Regards to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1991, E.T.S. No. 108,
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The primary objective of Convention 108 is to guarantee every in-
dividual a "right to data protection.'" Importantly, however, domes-
tic legislation of individual Member States is necessary to achieve
this goal.' The Convention defines the quality of data that should be
collected within the parameters of five basic principles: (1) the fair
and lawful obtaining and processing of data; (2) the storage for spe-
cific and legitimate purposes; (3) the adequacy, relevance and non-
excessiveness of the storage in relation to the purpose; (4) the accu-
racy of the data; and (5) the usage of the data no longer than neces-
sary for the original purpose.'55
The issue of data protection in the European Union, including po-
lice data, was the subject of concern after the Council of Europe's
Convention 108. This is especially so with the advent of Europol and
its proposed system of information exchange. While the vast major-
ity of work on data protection involves the inclusion of data protec-
tion provisions in the various agreements on police cooperation,
work is ongoing in other fronts as well. Thus far, however, most of
these efforts have led to little more than brainstorming and debate.
2. Relations Between European Union and Third Party States
In the context of interactions between the European Union and
third parties-with lower levels of data protection-greater problems
may occur. This may especially be the case in CEE where political
and economic liberalization brings with it an ambition to establish
fundamental freedoms, including privacy and data protection. Such
efforts, however, have not moved at great speed, nor have they oc-
curred in all of the countries in the region.
arts. 22(1), 23 (1) [hereinafter Convention 108] (noting that Convention 108 is
open to Member States and that the Council of Europe may invite non-members to
accede to the Convention).
152. See Herald D.J. Jongen & Gerrit A. Vriezen, The Council of Europe and
the European Community, in DATA TRANSMISSION AND PRIVACY 139, 140 (Dennis
Campbell & Joy Fisher eds., 1994) (differentiating between those countries who
have signed Convention 108 and those that have passed the necessary implement-
ing legislation).
153. See Convention 108, supra note 151, art. I (identifying the purpose of the
Convention as to promote security of personal data).
154. See id. art. 4.
155. See id. art. 5.
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Article 59 of the 1989 Hungarian Constitution states: "[i]n the Re-
public of Hungary, everyone shall be entitled to good reputation, to
the inviolability of one's home, as well as to the protection of private
secrets and personal data."'' 56 Thus, it appears as if a basic constitu-
tional right to privacy exists. Additionally, in 1992, Hungary adopted
a special act on personal data protection that complies with the Euro-
pol Convention requirements.'5 7 Personal data is only accessible by
permission of its owner, and only for the aims that the owner stipu-
lates. ' Weakening the efficacy of this Act, however, the country re-
mains without an expansive system of data protection to regulate
personal data possession and transfer by national police or govern-
mental sources.
In the Czech Republic, the government adopted a substantive law
in 1992, influenced by the Council of Europe Convention.'" The Act
regulates information systems containing personal data established
both before and after adoption of the law. The law allows the na-
tional government to authorize the operation of already existing in-
formation systems that do not comply with the law, but only in ex-
ceptional cases and for a period not exceeding three years."
Although the Act provides for the establishment of a special regula-
tory body to control compliance, to date, controversies surrounding
the level of power afforded to the body continue to prevent its estab-
lishment.
In Slovakia, the protection of personal data is guaranteed by Arti-
cle 19(3) of its Constitution, which provides that "[e]veryone has the
right to be protected against the unwarranted collection, publication,
or other illicit use of his personal data.""'6 Two other constitutional
156. A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKETMANYA [Constitution] art. 59 (1989)
(Hungary), available in <http://www.hungaryemb.org.ctrh.htm>.
157. See generally Act LXIII of 1992 on the Protection of Personal Data and the
Publicity of Data of Public Interest (Hungary), available in
<http://www.bild.acad.bg/privacyHU.htm>.
158. See id. sec. 5, para. 1.
159. See The Act on Protection of Personal Data in Information Systems, Apr.
29, 1992 (Czech Republic), summary available in <http://www.privacyexchange.
org>.
160. See id.
161. SLOVK. CONST. art. 19(3), available in <http://slovakia.eunet.sk/slovakia
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provisions provide for additional protection of personal data. Article
22(1) states that "the privacy of correspondence and secrecy of
mailed messages and other written documents and the protection of
personal data are guaranteed."'' 2 In addition, Article 22(2) provides
that:
[n]o one must violate the privacy of correspondence and the secrecy of
other written documents and records, whether they are kept in privacy or
sent by mail or in another way, with the exception of cases to be set out in
law. Equally guaranteed in the secrecy of messages conveyed by tele-
phone, telegraph or other similar means.
The Romanian Constitution offers some general principles on the
protection of personal data." Article 26 provides that "the public
authorities shall respect the family and private life."'' Article 31, en-
titled "Right to Information," provides that the right of access to any
information of public interest cannot be restricted. Moreover, this
constitutional provision requires public authorities to provide accu-
rate information to the citizens in areas of public affairs. Finally,
public and private media are obligated to provide correct informa-
tion.'"
Bulgaria offers vague methods of data protection in Article 32(1)
of its Constitution:-
67
The privacy of the citizens is inviolable. Everyone is entitled to protection
against any illegal interference in private or family affairs and against en-
croachment on his honor, dignity and reputation. No one shall be fol-
lowed, photographed, filmed, recorded or subjected to any other similar
/history-politics/slovak-constitution.txt>.
162. Id. art. 22(l).
163. Id. art. 22(2). For further information on the protection of data in the pri-
vate sector in the Slovak Republic, see Jan Drgonec, Computer Lair in the Slovak
Republic, 9 COMPUTER L. & PRAC., No. 3, at 87 (1993).
164. See ROM. CONST. arts. 26, 31 (1991), available in <http://
vw.kappa.ro/guv/consti.html>.
165. See id. art. 26
166. See id. art. 31.
167. See BULG. CONST. art. 32(1) (1991), available in <http://www.uni-
wuerzburg.de/;aw/buOOOOO.html>.
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activity without his knowledge or despite his express disapproval, except
when such actions are permitted by the law.'
In addition, Article 34 of the Bulgarian Constitution provides that the
freedom and confidentiality of correspondence and all other commu-
nications shall be sacrosanct. 169 In spite of these constitutional provi-
sions, Bulgaria is currently without any laws to enforce these protec-
tions.
Like many of its neighbors, Poland lacks a generic data protection
law. In addition, Poland's Constitution does not contain any provi-
sions establishing privacy rights. Nonetheless, an Ombudsman con-
siders right to privacy and data protection complaints. 7 1 Such cases
are rare, though they do exist.
Slovenia has enacted data protection legislation. The Personal
Data Protection Act' 7' is based on the Organization of Economic Co-
operation and Development ("OECD") guidelines governing the
protection of privacy and trans-border flows of personal data.' 72 The
Act applies to the private sectors and to both manual and automated
data. The Act requires the registration of data files with the Republi-
can Administration-the body responsible for enforcing the provi-
sions of the Act.'73 There is also a trans-border data flow provision,
which requires the recipient country to have data protection laws in
force before data transmission occurs.174
Macedonia has a constitutional provision that is related to the
protection of personal data. Article 18 of the Macedonian Constitu-
tion provides that "the security and confidentiality of personal infor-
mation are guaranteed. Citizens are guaranteed protection from any
168. Id. art. 32(1).
169. See id. art. 34.
170. See ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 21 (1994).
171. The Personal Data Protection Act (1990) (Slovenia).
172. See ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, sit-
pra note 170, at 68-70.
173. See The Personal Data Protection Act arts. 30-32 (1990) (Slovenia).
174. See id. arts. 26-29.
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violation of their personal integrity deriving from the registration of
personal information through data processing.""5
The European integration process, particularly the increasing pos-
sibility that CEE nations will become Member States, creates a new
threat to the fundamental right of privacy. Many of the existing and
evolving mechanisms of European Community police cooperation
rely upon data collection, analysis, and exchange. ' The security of
this information is crucial to international police cooperation in
Europe.'77 Consequently, management of the technology systems
themselves is required and, at the same time, monitoring new tech-
nologies is essential.
3. The Schengen Agreement
Under Schengen, the contracting parties are obligated to individu-
ally adopt data protection standards at least equivalent to those set
forth in Convention 108.'7* In cases of non-compliance, Schengen
forbids the transmission of personal data to the territory of the Mem-
ber State.179 Convention 108, however, is insufficient to achieve a
universal minimum standard of data protection and act as a starting
point for further development. Thus, Schengen created additional
safeguards to prevent against the abuse of personal data.
175. MACED. CONST. art. 18, available in <http://www.soros.org.mk/mk
enlconst.htm>.
176. See Neil Walker, European Integration and European Policing: A Complex
Relationship, in POLICING ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, supra note 82, at 22,
28 (noting the importance of creating new databases for information exchange, and
providing a facility for central analysis of information to help the planning of op-
erational investigations).
177. See Francis R. Monaco, Comment, Europol: The Culmination of the Euro-
pean Union's International Police Cooperation Efforts, 19 FORDHANI INT'L LJ.
247, 286 (1995) (stating that Europol holds a Member State that supplies informa-
tion responsible for the information's security); see also Kenneth G. Robertson,
Practical Police Cooperation hI Europe: The Intelligence Dimension, in POLICING
ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, supra note 82, 106, 112-16 (describing the prac-
tical applications of information exchange agreements such as Interpol, Trevi, the
Schengen Information System, and Europol).
178. See Schengen Convention, supra note 66, art. 117(1); see also Convention
108, supra note 151, arts. 5-8 (delineating standards for data quality and security).
179. See Schengen Convention, supra note 66, art. 117(2).
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Although Schengen provides increased opportunity for the collec-
tion and exchange of data, the agreement restricts certain data uses. 1O
The Schengen implementing convention contains two sets of data
protection regulations, one of which applies to the exchange of in-
formation in general.18" ' The other, a more detailed scheme, governs
the SIS.'82 The main principle is that data filed with the SIS may only
be used for the purposes established for each type of report.'" The
provisions limit the number of people with access to the data, "4 and
mandate the accuracy, timeliness, and lawfulness of the data entered
into the system.1
85
The vagueness of these provisions, however, is a potential prob-
lem. As currently constructed, these provisions leave a lot open to
interpretation. In addition, the articles would be more useful if they
were more stringent and offered a higher level of data protection. Fi-
nally, and most importantly, there is no mention of a specific Euro-
pean judicial authority responsible for monitoring disputes arising
under the provisions.
Furthermore, Schengen provisions are in place to protect the rights
of individuals. For instance, Article 109 guarantees the right of any
person to have access to data pertaining to him.' 6 The individual also
has the right to have factually inaccurate data corrected or legally in-
accurate data deleted.' 87 In addition to the aforementioned criticisms,
the exercise of personal rights under Schengen must be in accordance
with national law. The applicable national law is not dependent in the
180. See id. art. 102 (noting that data may only be duplicated for technical pur-
poses, and data may never be used for administrative purposes).
181. See id. art. 39 (discussing the exchange of information in furtherance of
police cooperation among Contracting Parties).
182. See id. arts. 102-18 (explaining the protection of personal and security data
under the Schengen Information System).
183. See id. art. 102(1).
184. See Schengen Convention, supra note 66, art. 101 (explaining that access to
data is reserved for authorities responsible for border checks and other police cus-
tom checks, as well as by people responsible for issuing and examining visas).
185. See id. art. 105.
186. See id. art. 109.
187. See id. art. 106 (stating that only the reporting Contracting Party is author-
ized to amend, supplement, correct, or delete data that it introduced).
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nationality of individual but on the territory in which the individual
invokes his rights. In the end, some complainants could engage in
"forum shopping," searching for the jurisdiction which best protects
their rights.
4. Europol
The collection, retention, and exchange of information constitute
the cornerstone of Europol.'"9 Indeed, under Article K.1(9) of the
Maastricht Treaty, Europol is intended to be a "Union-wide system
for exchanging information within Europol." ' As such, there is a
very real concern about how to protect the public from abuses of this
kind of data system.
As the European Union undertook steps to create Europol, the
management of data raised a number of serious questions. There
were critical concerns about what kind of information could be pro-
vided to Europol by local police, as well as what kind of information
could be accessed by these local authorities. At first, the French gov-
ernment argued that liaison officers should have access to everything
on the Europol system.'O To the contrary, Germany and the United
Kingdom asserted that information should only be available on a
"need to know basis."' 9' Their concern was that sensitive information
needs protection. The two countries additionally expressed the prac-
tical fear that foreign agencies would not provide crucial information
to the Europol system if there were a threat of widespread data dis-
semination. ' 92 Through compromise, the countries agreed that routine
information would flow freely; a Europol "inner core" would hold
sensitive information. '19
188. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note I, art. K.l(9); see also Europol Conven-
tion, supra note 24, art. 3 (identifying the tasks of Europol and its functions for
collecting and exchanging information).
189. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1. art. K.l(9).
190. See Convention Against Crime, supra note 2, at 53.
191. Id.
192. See id.
193. See id. (noting that the British dislike the "inner core" concept); Europol
Convention, supra note 24, art. 31 (detailing measures to ensure confidentiality of
information).
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Another area of sensitivity surrounded the storage length of infor-
mation. In the context of criminal databases, such as those used by
Europol, the removal of entered data was a common concern. To ad-
dress this issue, the Europol Convention added Article 8(5), which
provides that if proceedings against an individual are dropped or re-
sult in the acquittal of the individual, the data relevant to these deci-
sions shall be deleted.'94 This does not require deletion of all infor-
mation pertaining to the individual. Rather, it merely indicates that
the information must be deleted if it relates to the particular decision
to end proceedings or acquit the individual.95 It is likely, therefore,
that some amount of personal information will remain in the system.
Moreover, because Europol has broad authority to maintain data
on individuals,'96 issues relating to dismissal of charges or acquittals
may be relevant. Individuals could still be included in Europol's
computers simply because there is continuing suspicion that the indi-
vidual either already has committed or will commit a criminal of-
fense for which Europol is competent. There is no clear guidance on
how, or if, such individuals can ever remove themselves from the
computer system of Europol. Article 21(1), however, indicates that
data files shall be retained only for the time necessary for the per-
formance of the data's tasks.'97
Nonetheless, the Europol Convention does contain certain provi-
sions designed to protect individuals from misuse and abuse of data.
For instance, Article 20(4) states that an individual has the right to
correct or delete erroneous data concerning him.'98 Europol must cor-
rect or delete incorrect information and inform the complaining indi-
vidual within three months of the complaint. If the individual is not
satisfied with Europol's response, or if he does not receive a reply
from Europol within three months, he may refer the matter to the
joint supervisory body.' 99 The joint supervisory body has the task of
194. See Europol Convention, supra note 24, art. 8(5).
195. See id.
196. See id. art. 8(1)(1)-(2) (enumerating the categories of people on whom data
may be maintained).
197. Seeid.art.21(1).
198. See id. art. 20(4).
199. See Europol Convention, supra note 24, art. 20(4).
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reviewing the activities of Europol to ensure that data use does not
violate the rights of individuals.2' The joint supervisory body is
composed of not more than two members of each of the national su-
pervisory bodies."'
In addition to these measures, Article 25 of the Convention pro-
vides for data protection in a number of different manners."2 This
Article provides that each Member State and Europol shall imple-
ment measures designed to: (1) prevent unauthorized access to data,
including preventing its inspection, modification, or deletion; (2) en-
sure data access control such that persons may only access data cov-
ered by their access authorization; (3) establish and verify the data
entered, when and by whom the data was entered, as well as the in-
stitutions to which data is being transferred; (4) ensure that installed
systems may be immediately restored in the case of a failure or inter-
ruption; and (5) ensure that the system functions without fault and
that stored data cannot be corrupted by means of a system malfunc-
tion. 3
Although significant, these provisions are only as useful as the
actual measures implemented by the Member States and Europol.
Clearly, each Member State has a great deal of discretion in deter-
mining how to utilize these measures in order to achieve the stated
results. Moreover, several of the measures on data protection refer to
ensuring that the data in Europol's computerized information system
will remain in existence, in good condition, and available for use by
Europol.2'0 Therefore, the effectiveness of these measures in pre-
venting the misuse and abuse of data remains to be seen.
The possibility of data theft is another potential problem that is in-
adequately addressed by the defense mechanisms of Article 25. Re-
gardless of the various laws adopted by the Community or by Mem-
ber States, third parties have the opportunity to steal the data and use
200. See id. art. 24.
201. See id. art. 24 (detailing the necessary characteristics of the members of the
joint supervisory board).
202. See id. art. 25 (suggesting ten different methods for data protection).
203. See id. art. 25(2)(1-10).
204. See Europol Convention, supra note 24, art. 25(2)(6-10) (including provi-
sions to that primarily benefit Europol).
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it for illicit purposes. Exemplifying this very serious problem, in De-
cember 1997, individuals in Belgium stole data on organized crime
collected by the Europol Drug Unit."5 Thus, even if tight security
characterizes the Europol regime as a whole, mediocre security in
one Member State can destroy the whole system.
5. Recommendations
One comprehensive mechanism is needed to protect all European
Union citizens from the existing and developing means of data col-
lection and distribution. The European Community appears to have
made a half-hearted attempt to accomplish this through the European
Community Directive on Personal Data Processing ("Directive").'
On July 18, 1990, the Commission submitted throughout the Com-
munity a package of new measures pertaining to data protection and
the free flow of data, the Directive was a part of this package. After
many amendments, 7 the European Parliament and the Council
adopted the Directive on July 24, 1995.208
The Directive creates a framework with broad principles of data
protection and the possibility of exemptions on an as-needed basis.
Applying to both the public and private sectors the Directive covers
"'any information relating to an identified or identifiable individ-
ual."'09 Through the establishment of obligatory general data proc-
essing principles, and with the creation of specific control rights, the
205. See Barry James, Belgian Police Face Growing Distrust: Charges of In-
competence and Laxity are Leveled at Fragmented Forces, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Mar. 2, 1998, at 2.
206. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Individuals
in Relation to the Processing of Personal Data, 1990 O.J. (C 277) 3 [hereinafter
Data Processing Directive] (discussing the European Community's new objectives
relating to data protection).
207. See Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Protection of Indi-
viduals in Relation to the Processing of Personal Data and the Free Movement of
Such Data, 1992 O.J. (C 311) 30 (presenting amendments to the Data Processing
Directive).
208. See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter EC Direc-
tive].
209. Id. art. 2(a).
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Directive endeavors to protect the rights of the citizen. Specifically,
the Directive prohibits the automatic processing of sensitive data re-
vealing "ethnic or racial origin, political opinions, religious or philo-
sophical beliefs or trade union membership, and of data concerning
health or sexual life. ' '2'0 Either the explicit consent of the data subject
or grounds of important public interest may override this restric-
tion. 1
Despite the wide scope of the Directive, concerns remain about its
potential effectiveness in protecting the individual citizen, particu-
larly regarding cooperation in the police sector. Most importantly,
under the Directive activities outside the scope of Community law
are excluded from the Directive's restrictions.:'2 The Directive also
excludes data processing operations undergone for reasons of public
safety or security, and State activities in areas of criminal law." For
this reason, despite the comprehensive nature of the provision and its
strong language, the Directive provides little practical protection to
individuals concerned about police use of personal data.
Within the European Union, one of the greatest problems relating
to the proliferation of police data is the lack of a specific and uniform
regime to control the attainment, maintenance and transfer of data.
Member States need clear guidance from the Community about the
proper use of personal data. This can be accomplished in a manner
that permits the Member States some leeway and takes into account
specific circumstances.
Business concerns have impeded the Community's creation of a
more comprehensive system for the protection of personal data. In a
number of countries, a significant body of individuals and companies
are active in lobbying against the creation of stringent data protection
regulations. Businesses, especially those involved in information ex-
change, often contend that data protection legislation impedes the
progress and development of a global information structure.!"4
210. Id. art 8(1).
211. See id. art. 8(2)(a), (c).
212. See id. art. 3(2).
213. See EC Directive, supra note 208 (setting forth other factors that prohibit
the processing of personal data).
214. See Jan Berkvens, Will the Data Protection Directive Prevent a Global In-
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Thus far, Community action on data protection in the public sector
has focused on the inclusion of data protection provisions within the
various agreements calling for increased police cooperation. Provi-
sions relating to specific agreements will not be sufficient. A Com-
munity-based effort is needed to control all aspects of personal data
available to the police. At the same time, the strengthening of judi-
cial and democratic controls on the activity of international police
work in the European Union will reduce legitimate concerns about
the use and maintenance of personal data by police and related gov-
ernmental forces. Such a comprehensive and inclusive approach to
protect individual rights would foster an increased level of accep-
tance for police cooperation.
This recommendation is analogous to the state of data protection
in the United States. In the United States, a state's attempts to regu-
late issues pertaining to privacy must conform to federal constitu-
tional provisions on the freedom of speech, as well as any other fed-
eral legislation on the issue.215 This can and should be done in the
European Union. The creation of a Community-wide minimum stan-
dard for the use of all personal data by police and State authorities
would create cohesion in the system and ensure greater levels of
rights protection.
B. DEMOCRATIC CONTROL
One definition of democracy is parliamentary control of inter-
governmental policies and decisions. The gap in the power between
the Commission, Council of Ministers, and European Council, as
well as that of the national parliaments and the European Parliament
creates a democratic deficit. Because the European Union is an or-
ganization consisting of democratic States, it is itself undemocratic.
In the past, and in the present to a certain extent, the institutions in
formation Structure?, 2 COMPUTER L. & PRAC. 38, 42 (1995) (arguing that the
Data Protection Directive is not designed to further development of "the global in-
formation infrastructure").
215. See generally Ben F. Overton & Katherine E. Giddings, The Right Of Pri-
vacy In Florida In The Age Of Technology And The Twenty-First Century: A Need
For Protection From Private And Commercial Intrusion, 20 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 16
(1997) (discussing United States legislative efforts in the areas of data protection
and privacy).
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the European Union with the most power were not democratically
elected.2 6
The problem of democratic deficit is particularly clear within the
context of international police cooperation in Europe. The intergov-
ernmental structure of international police cooperation implies a lack
of formal democratic powers by the national parliaments as well as
the European Parliament to exercise direct control over European
policing bodies.7
In addition, many of the specific mechanisms for increasing inter-
national police cooperation lack sufficient democratic controls. For
instance, Interpol and Trevi have few democratic qualities. This is
due to the organizational characteristics of these bodies. Another ex-
ample is the failure of many national parliaments in Western Europe
to account for their own government involvement, or the role of their
police forces in the cooperation mechanisms. Moreover, the role of
the European Parliament has been marginalized-particularly in
matters relating to cross-border police cooperation. The Parliament
has voiced its concern about this and has announced that it will take
a more active role in the matters of Title VI.'
Currently, the European Council is of the position that it must
conclude a specific treaty regarding Europol. This may reduce some
of the existing democratic deficit concerning international police co-
operation in Europe. Based on the Maastricht Treaty, the European
Commission will take an active role in Europol decisions and activi-
ties. Although this is further proof of an increasing trend towards the
democratization of police cooperation in Europe, further steps are
necessary.
The Council currently has primary power over a wide majority of
decisions in the field of police cooperation. This raises a number of
216. See Juliet Lodge, Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy, 32 J. OF
COMMON MKT. STUD. 343, 355 (1994) (detailing arguments about the unequal
distribution of power between the Council and the Parliament).
217. See Miller-Graff, supra note 51, at 495 (describing the institutions with re-
sponsibilities for implementing the third pillar).
218. See Resolution on Participation by the European Parliament on Coopera-
tion in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs, 1994 O.J. (C 44) (discussing the
need for the European parliament to participate in the creation and implementation
of international agreements in the fields ofjustice and home affairs).
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considerable concerns. As has been pointed out by analysts in other
areas, there is apprehension that the Council-which is comprised of
the executive branches of national governments and meets collec-
tively-could adopt legislation unapproved by either the European or
the national parliaments. 9 This issue becomes particularly relevant
in the debate over police cooperation, as the Council is often the only
European body which has an appreciable level of power within this
220area.
In the immediate future, there are considerable problems with
democratic participation in the European Union in the context of jus-
tice and home affairs, including police cooperation. This is especially
evident where the principle of bottom-up subsidiary is concerned. As
the current system is organized, social legitimacy, transparency, and
active citizen control over police activity are seriously lacking. As
accountability for policing activities moves from the local and re-
gional level to the international level, anonymity and distance be-
tween the citizens and police will increase. This is problematic from
a number of viewpoints. Increased suspicion and distrust of the po-
lice on the part of the citizen will result. At the same time, it might
also encourage the police to step out of the guidelines of commonly
accepted behavior, believing that transgressions will be more diffi-
cult to detect in a transnational system.
1. Attempted Solutions
The Commission has made few attempts to rectify fully the prob-
lems of democratic deficit in the area of police cooperation. The is-
sue of governmental transparency is extremely important to democ-
racy, and "[i]t is often assumed that openness is one of the hallmarks
of a social, liberal democratic society."22' The Commission has, how-
219. See Lodge, supra note 216, at 345 (identifying the imbalance in legislative
matters between the Council's and the European Parliament as a reason for the
Council's weak accountability to either the European or national parliaments).
220. See id. (mentioning the historical argument that accountability would only
be strengthened by making the Council and Parliament a bicameral legislature with
co-equal powers).
221. Id. at 356-57.
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ever, attempted to make its activities more transparent and has pro-
vided additional information about its work."
The new information and communication policy of the European
Union institutions cannot fully address the problems of democratic
deficit 3 particularly in the area of police cooperation where there
are virtually no opportunities for democratic participation. As such,
increased transparency, while useful in other areas, will have virtu-
ally no impact on the ability of European citizens to participate in
decisions relating to cross-border policing.
2. Reconnendations
Although fostering true democracy in a supranational organization
such as the European Union requires a certain level of creativity and
ingenuity, a number of steps can be taken to improve the situation.
Specifically, the institutions of the European Union need to obtain a
greater participatory role in activities and legislation. Currently, op-
portunities for any level of participation, and even access to infor-
mation, are extremely limited. Due to the requirements of "confiden-
tiality," "operational matters," and "security," the European
Parliament has great difficulty in securing documentation relating to
the Council's activities in the field of justice and home affairs. As a
first step in eliminating the democratic deficit in the area of interna-
tional police cooperation, the Parliament should assume a greater
role in working on this issue. As the third pillar becomes more inte-
grated into the fundamental workings of the European Union-and
methods of decisionmaking are altered-a higher level of democratic
participation will develop.
C. LACK OF ADEQUATE LEGAL AND JUDICIAL SUPPORT
A significant problem in fostering increased levels of international
police cooperation within Europe is the absence of clear legal direc-
tion. The variation in criminal law and procedure, which often exists
222. See id. at 350-53 (detailing the efforts of the Commission to promote trans-
parency and concluding that these efforts made the legislative process more demo-
cratic).
223. See id. at 344 (noting that the new information and communication policy
merely lays the groundwork for ultimately redressing the democratic deficit).
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among Member States, is potentially detrimental to European citi-
zens if police cooperation is continued and expanded without a cor-
responding legal foundation.
There is a lack of legal harmonization in criminal law and proce-
dure occurring on a number of different levels. First, there is a lack
of semantic harmonization. Among the Member States of the Euro-
pean Union, there is a wide discrepancy in the legal definitions of
criminal activity. This could have a number of negative implications.
If Member States do not agree on the basic definitions of common
legal terms in the field of criminal justice, it will be profoundly diffi-
cult to make substantial progress on higher levels of cooperation.
Ultimately, the process by which common definitions for these terms
will be established depends on the role of the European Court of Jus-
tice ("ECJ").
Second, there are problems harmonizing operational definitions in
the practice of transnational police cooperation. This refers to the
sharp differences that often exist between the national criminal pro-
cedures of Member States. Procedural differences exist as to how to
conduct investigations, obtain criminal evidence, arrest suspects, en-
gage in hot pursuit, conduct interrogations, and engage in pre-trial
investigation. Moreover, there are important differences among
Member States in the conduct of criminal trials. Rules of witnesses,
evidence, pleadings, and interrogation differ among Member
States.224 Such differences ultimately effect the conduct of police of-
ficers in carrying out their duties and may present obstacles to in-
creased levels of international police cooperation.
Third, there is a lack of harmonization of rules of mutual judicial
assistance and legal aid. This is especially important regarding the
issue of Community policing. With greater police cooperation at the
Community level, the need arises to harmonize the various resources
available to criminal defendants.
Finally, the organization of international judicial monitoring of
cross-border police activities is critical. The increased levels of inter-
224. See Donna Gomiev, The Future of Fair Trial in Europe: The Contributions
of International Human Rights, Legal and Political Instruments, 9 NETH. Q. HUM.
RTS. 263, 264 (1991) (discussing some of the fair trial standards that human rights
conventions are establishing).
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national police cooperation, which occur despite the absence of ade-
quate legal foundations, distort the balance of power between crimi-
nal defendants and prosecuting authorities. "The defense does not
have independent access to the foreign networks available to the po-
lice, even though it might have legitimate need thereof."225
1. Attenipted Solutions
There have been few attempts to correct the problems associated
with the lack of legal and judicial support. Indeed, one of the most
serious and obvious drawbacks to the Schengen agreement is the ab-
sence of judicial support and legal redress for individuals. Schengen,
did not appoint a single judicial body to interpret and enforce its pro-
visions. -6 There is an increased level of judicial support within the
context of the Europol agreement. It is not sufficient, however, for
what one expects and demands from a democratic system.
Many suggest granting the ECJ jurisdiction over major criminal
law agreements, such as the Europol Convention.'-- This would en-
sure a greater level of judicial protection for activities carried out un-
der these agreements. Political differences, however, have held back
such proposals. Especially in countries heavily impacted by the eco-
nomic recession, a new nationalism is surging. Consequently, coun-
tries such as Italy, German, and the United Kingdom are concerned
over the potential loss of sovereignty to European institutions that
might render them less able to respond effectively to internal politi-
cal and economic problems. -, Likewise, there is a great reluctance
on the part of Member States to harmonize their criminal legislation.
It appears, however, that this may change in the future as Member
225. O'Keefe, supra note 83, at 203.
226. See Baldwin-Edwards & Hebenton, supra note 82, at 150-53 (observing
that domestic legal systems are primarily responsible for enforcing Schengen pro-
visions without any supervision by a supranational authority).
227. See, e.g., Monica Den Boer, Police Cooperation in the TEU: Tiger in a
Trojan Horse, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 555. 563 (1995) (discussing various
proposals to expand the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and the de-
bates surrounding these proposals).
228. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 26. at 261, 263-65 (asserting that Euro-
pean power is viewed by many Europeans in zero-sum terms such that increasing
the power of a supranational entity necessarily erodes national self-determination
in individual countries).
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States realize that such changes are necessary in the European Un-
ion's increasingly integrated marketplace.
2. Recommendations
In order for any of the new methods of police cooperation to work,
there must be a must higher level of legal and judicial support than
currently exists. A reduction in the problems associated with the lack
of legal support requires greater harmonization of laws between the
Member States on matters relating to criminal law. In reality, this is
likely to occur slowly, as Member States will be inclined to maintain
their grasp on this remaining aspect of their sovereignty and indi-
viduality.
Additionally, there must be concrete steps to improve drastically
the currently existing legal and judicial support. The lack of any ju-
dicial machinery to deal with the disputes that will inevitably arise
within the context of the agreements on police cooperation is lamen-
table. The most effective way to accomplish this is to grant jurisdic-
tion over these matters to one European court-perhaps a new court
created specifically for these matters. In relation to Schengen, for ex-
ample, David O'Keefe contends that "a new court is needed, attached
like the Court of First Instance to the Court of Justice, with jurisdic-
tion in asylum, immigration, international police cooperation con-
cerning aliens, data protection and other topics raised by the move-
ment of persons within the context of the single market."229 The same
suggestion can be made for matters included under Title VI and Eu-
ropol.
Obviously, increased judicial support is required over that which
currently exists. Granting jurisdiction to the existing European courts
is insufficient, however. Doing so might lead to docket overcrowding
and substantial delays in rendering judgments. At the same time, the
judicial body should be well versed in the matters before it. These
factors emphasize the need for a specialized court to deal with these
matters.
229. O'Keefe, supra note 83, at 212.
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D. RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF MEMBER STATES
Another potential obstacle to increased police cooperation within
the Member States of the European Union concerns the rise of na-
tionalistic tendencies, which may interfere with the goal of increased
cooperation. In many ways, police units of Member States are not
prepared to engage in highly sophisticated levels of international po-
lice cooperation. Some experts have predicted an increased incidence
of "turf wars," as different European police organizations compete
for a greater share of police work.230
Transnational police work contends not only with the normal do-
mestic friction-arising out of distinctive political, social, economic,
and legal systems and cultures-but also with tensions stemming
from State sovereignty. Even when acting under terms of an actual or
tacit agreement, police officials engaging in cross-border activities
must be vigilant to avoid infringing on national sovereignty. The cur-
rent system of international police cooperation in Europe is not well
organized. As such, it is often difficult for the ordinary police officer
to understand how to conduct cross-border activities without im-
pinging on the sovereignty of another Member State.
While concern about the likelihood of nationalistic tendencies in-
terfering with increased police cooperation may be well founded,
there is also reason to believe that these issues may be worked out.
As national police forces and other bodies increase their knowledge
of the systems of other Member States, there will likely be a greater
familiarity, and an accompanying level of trust, with one another. In
addition, the eventual harmonization of laws in the criminal field will
add to this increased trust thereby facilitating greater cooperation.
IV. THE FUTURE
At the time of this writing, the Treaty of Amsterdam" is still
awaiting full ratification by European Union Member States. None-
230. See Piet Van Reenen, Policing Europe After 1992: Cooperation and Con-
petition, 2 EUR. AFF. 42 (1989).
231. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Trea-
ties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Nov. 10,
1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, available in <http://ue.eu.int/Amsterdam/er/Amsteroc/
en.htm> [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
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theless, the direction taken by this treaty on issues of cross-border
police and judicial cooperation is of interest. Taken as a whole, the
Amsterdam Treaty is a concrete step towards Community cohesive-
ness.
The Treaty of Amsterdam has added important provisions con-
cerning police cooperation in Europe. Provisions on Police and Judi-
cial Cooperation in Criminal Matters are found in Articles 29 to 42
of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The first article, 29, takes the place of
former Article K.1. This provision states the objective of the Com-
munity in working towards police and judicial cooperation in crimi-
nal matters.232
One important new provision is Article 31 .233 This provision
promises common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
Such action is to include:
(a) facilitating and accelerating cooperation between competent ministries
and judicial or equivalent authorities of the Member States in relation to
the proceedings and the enforcement of decisions; (b) facilitating extradi-
tion between Member States; (c) ensuring compatibility in rules applica-
ble in the Member States, as may be necessary to improve such coopera-
tion; (d) preventing conflicts of jurisdiction between Member States; and
(e) progressively adopting measures establishing minimum rules relating
to the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties in the fields of
organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking.21
One of the most significant developments included in the Treaty of
Amsterdam, vis-&-vis increased trans-border police cooperation, is
the granting of a certain level of competence to the ECJ to consider a
limited number of related subject matter."5 The ECJ has jurisdiction,
subject to certain conditions, to give preliminary rulings on the va-
lidity and interpretation of framework decisions, and to render deci-
sions on the interpretation of conventions established under the
Treaty of Amsterdam.236 Moreover, the ECJ has the power to rule on
the validity and interpretation of the measures implementing the pro-
232. See id. art. K.1.
233. See id. art. K.3.
234. Id. art. K.3(a)-(e).
235. See id. art. K.7.
236. See id. art. K.7(1).
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visions of the Treaty of Amsterdam. " This aspect of the treaty is ex-
tremely important as one of the biggest criticisms of previous treaties
was their failure to provide for judicial control. As such, this provi-
sion could go a considerable distance in improving the legitimacy of
the regime.
The jurisdiction of the ECJ is limited, however, by the Member
States' willingness to accept such jurisdiction. Article K.7(2) states:
"By a declaration made at the time of signature of the Treaty of Am-
sterdam or at any time thereafter, any Member State shall be able to
accept the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to give preliminary
rulings as specified in paragraph 1."' Although the Treaty of Am-
sterdam appears to take some important steps towards increased po-
lice cooperation, future progress rests in the hands of the individual
Member States and not under the full auspices of the Community.
Therefore, increased international police cooperation will be gradual
and deliberate.
CONCLUSION
The need for international cooperation in crime prevention and
control is increasing worldwide. Modem criminal policy is no longer
conceivable if it does not include an international element. The inter-
nationalization of economic activities and transport leads to a dra-
matic internationalization of crimes. This is particularly important
within the context of the European Union. As changes in law and
policy have facilitated the free movement of goods, services, per-
sons, and capital, so too have they facilitated the movement of crimi-
nal activity. It is thus only natural that cross-border mechanisms of
policing continue to develop.
Recent years have brought tremendous legal changes in interna-
tional policing. Until the recent past, international policing was
largely conducted through under-cover operations or secret intergov-
ernmental initiatives. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the
Schengen Convention, and a whole host of bilateral and multilateral
treaties, signals the conclusion of such an era. Nonetheless, the future
of a "Community Police Force" remains uncertain at the moment.
237. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 231, art. K.7(6).
238. Id. art. K.7(2).
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Although some form of policing at the Community level is neces-
sary, concerns exist about the current manifestations of international
policing in the European Union. Certain critics have expressed fear
that recent developments will actually complicate and hamper inter-
national police activities. Others remain concerned about the possible
negative implications that the system may have on human rights.
Clearly, in order to be truly effective, Member States must improve
certain aspects of the current agreements on international police co-
operation. Most importantly, the European Union must improve judi-
cial and legal support, increase democratization, and enhance data
and privacy protection. The European Union should not continue the
quest towards greater international police cooperation until these im-
portant matters are dealt with.
The move towards a greater level of international cooperation
among national police forces and criminal investigation organiza-
tions is a big step, even when considered in the context of the Euro-
pean Union where a high level of integration and harmonization ex-
ists in other areas. It remains questionable whether the long
established relationship between national States and the act of polic-
ing will serve as a hindrance to the development of supranational
policing bodies and institutions. As has been the case with other as-
pects of European integration, the move towards greater police coop-
eration is likely to take substantial time and considerable effort.
Much of the foundation is already in place, the remaining question is
whether Member States will have the political will necessary to har-
monize and integrate this area of activity.
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